Simulism (or the simulation hypothesis) proposes that reality is a simulation of which the agents created by the simulant are not aware. In other words, it raises the possibility that our existence and the world around us are the result of an incredibly complex computer program created and controlled by a more advanced entity. To what extent can we assume that everything we see, hear, notice and touch is real? What if the world we perceive is nothing more than a complex fiction? ⌚ Timeline: 00:00-05:47 - Introduction. 05:47-11:18 - What is simulism? 11:18-13:43 - Bostrom's trilemma. 13:43-21:30 - The simulational artifact. 21:30-29:10 - The role of qualia. 29:10-36:27 - The brain in a vat. 36:27-40:51 - Criticisms. 40:51-42:02 - Conclusion. 🎙️ Support the channel ► patreon.com/ramtalks 🤝 You can also support the channel via: Paypal: paypal.me/ramtalks Bitcoin: bc1qphz6ezqf73aulh45xhm7392g0t8atcjmnxrwn2 Ethereum: 0x7A60dDc5CE36A7F14eca287bC12580C83A8A6b11 See you on my social networks? 💣 Instagram ► / ramtalks 📱 TikTok ► @ramtalks 💬 Twitter ► / ramtalksyt​​​​​​​​​​ ♣️ Facebook ► / ramtalksyt​​ The most up-to-date version of the simulation hypothesis emerged in 2003 with the publication of an article by Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom, whose main premise is contained in the following fragment: «A considerable number of technologists and futurologists predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be available in the future. Assuming that these predictions are correct, future generations could use their supercomputers to run detailed simulations of their ancestors or individuals similar to them. In short, it would be feasible for simulated people to be endowed with consciousness if the virtual architecture were sufficiently detailed and a certain position in the philosophy of mind were correct. If so, then we might not ourselves belong to the original species, but to entities simulated by its advanced descendants; and, by analogy, it would be meaningless to think that there would be people interested in running computer simulations of their ancestry if one does not believe one currently lives in one. Despite the above, the inquiry into the motivations and purposes of future human beings in relation to the creation of virtual realities confronts us with an epistemological enigma of considerable magnitude. In this regard, one of the conditions that Bostrom raises is that the simulating individuals have advocated the use of science and technology to improve their human condition by increasing their physical and mental capacities with a view to both correcting their defects and increasing their performance. So, to what extent would it be a flagrant absurdity to conjecture about the reasons underlying the conception of a simulation by future human beings? And even more disturbing, would it make sense to call our hypothetical creators 'human beings'?