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Is there a plan after the collapse of the plan? This time the story of what happened on the Bukrin bridgehead in September-October 1943 after the failure of the Dnieper landing. The Voronezh Front was to play a key role in the battle for the Dnieper, so it was given the strongest reserves, in addition to the paratroopers, the front received a tank army at its disposal - the 3rd Guards Tank Army, which received reinforcements in men and equipment. The tank attack was to help in capturing Kiev. The tank and combined arms 40th Army managed to capture the bridgeheads before the German reserves entered the Bukrin bend. To what extent did the Soviet strategy of fighting for the Dnieper with forcing on a wide front and dispersing the crossing means among the armies show itself in the case of the Bukrin bridgehead? What obstacles arose in expanding the bridgehead and what other changes in plans were required after realizing the fact of the paratrooper landing failure? Why did G.K. Zhukov and N.F. Vatutin insist on continuing the offensive in their report to Headquarters? Support our projects: http://tacticmedia.ru/donate/ Early access to our news and videos: https://sponsr.ru/tacticmedia/ Tacticmedia Vkontakte: https://vk.com/tacticmedia Telegram: https://t.me/TacticMedia_Official Zen: https://zen.yandex.ru/tacticmedia Rutube: https://rutube.ru/channel/23606772/ Boosty: https://boosty.to/tacticmedia